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In many proportional representation (PR) systems, a legal electoral threshold 
has been implemented. Such a threshold reserves the allocation of seats to those 
parties which reach a minimum number of votes or a percentage of the votes. 
Since 2004, a legal threshold of five per cent has been introduced for the Belgian 
regional elections, following the introduction two years earlier of the same 
mechanism for the federal elections. The main reason behind this electoral reform 
– in a country which has been quite stable on this regard – was to prevent the 
further fragmentation of the political spectrum. This paper aims at testing this 
claim on empirical grounds. Two regional elections – 2004 and 2009 – can be 
surveyed in order to measure the effects of the electoral threshold. It is 
particularly relevant to study the impact of the electoral threshold in the regional 
elections because there are several discrepancies between the Regions in terms of 
the size of the districts, the fragmentation of the party system and the electorates. 
These differences may indeed influence the potential effects of the legal threshold. 
Since Duverger’s seminal work, electoral rules are known to influence the 
party system through their impact on the electoral outcomes, on the one hand, and 
on the electoral behaviour of both parties and voters, on the other hand. Two 
effects, which have been much further developed by the subsequent literature and 
are now widely accepted, are at stake here: the mechanical and the psychological. 
While the former refers to the objective mechanism of under-representation of 
some – usually the smaller – parties which may potentially lead to their 
disappearance because of the electoral laws, the latter implies the more subjective 
mechanism which can play at the level of both voters and party elites. Thus, in 
order to measure the impact of the legal five per cent threshold on the 
fragmentation, this paper tests the mechanical and the psychological effects for 
the Belgian regional elections of 2004 and 2009 (as well as for the federal 




In many proportional representation (PR) systems, a legal electoral threshold has been 
introduced (Martin, 2000). Such a threshold reserves the allocation of seats to those parties 
which reach a minimum number of votes or a percentage of the votes. To fight fragmentation 
is usually the main reason put forward in order to justify the existence of such a threshold 
(Cox, 1997; Pilet, 2007b; Pilet, 2007a). On the one hand, it is claimed to help reduce the 
effective number of parties and therefore minimize the risks of instability. On the other hand, 
it can also restrain the emergence of new parties. Although it is a common feature of electoral 
systems around the world, one can legitimately wonder whether the effects of such a legal 
threshold may lead to an undemocratic situation, or at least to an unreasonably disproportional 
allocation of seats. It is therefore useful – because of the lack of empirical research with a few 
exceptions (Hooghe et al., 2006) – to assess systematically the electoral and political effects 
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of the electoral threshold and thus answer the question whether it is the best way to fight 
fragmentation. To do so, studying the case of Belgium, a much fragmented political system 
(Deschouwer, 2009; Verjans, 2009), is particularly illuminating because, although it has 
experienced PR for more than a century, it has only recently introduced a legal threshold for 
both the federal and the regional elections. Thus, five general elections – three federal (2003, 
2007 and 2010) and two regional (2004 and 2009) – in a period of seven years can be 
surveyed in order to measure the effects of the electoral threshold. In this paper, we focus 
more on the regional elections but looking at the federal elections is also interesting for a 
comparative purpose. 
  
Since Duverger’s seminal work (Duverger, 1951), which however has been much 
refined since then (Rae, 1971; Bogdanor and Butler, 1983; Blais and Carty, 1991; Mair, 1997; 
Taagepera, 1998; Farrell, 2001; Norris, 2004; Hooghe et al., 2006), electoral rules are known 
to influence the party system through their impact on the electoral outcomes, on the one hand, 
and on the electoral behaviour of both parties and voters, on the other hand. Two effects, 
which have been much further developed by the subsequent literature and are now widely 
accepted (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, 65), are at stake here: the mechanical effect and the 
psychological effect. While the former refers to the objective mechanism of under-
representation of some – usually the smaller – parties which may potentially lead to their 
disappearance because of the electoral laws (Cox, 1997), the latter implies the more subjective 
mechanism which can play at the level of both voters and party elites (Blais and Carty, 1991).  
 
The introduction of a legal electoral threshold in any electoral system results from the 
will and the strategies of some political actors at one point in time. In order to measure the 
impact of such a threshold on a fragmented electoral system, this article tests the mechanical 
and the psychological effects over the regional – and the federal – Belgian elections. 
 
 2. The introduction of a five per cent legal electoral threshold in Belgium 
 
Before the 2002 electoral reform, the Belgian electoral system had been quite stable, 
despite some smaller albeit not insignificant changes (Hooghe and Deschouwer, forthcoming 
2011), since 1899 when the country moved from a system of plurality voting to a system of 
proportional representation – without any legal threshold. The change was pushed forward by 
a rainbow coalition made of six parties – two liberal, two socialist and two ecologist – in the 
wake of the 1999 election and the major electoral defeat of the Christian Democrats 
(Swyngedouw, 2002). The electoral reform came out the government’s will to bring the 
citizens back in – the political process and in particular the electoral. Specifically, the second-
tier division – the so-called apparentment – at the level of the province was highly criticised 
as being too complex and unpredictable not only for voters but also for parties (Hooghe et al., 
2006, 357; Pilet, 2007b), even though it did rarely affect the allocation of seats (Vander 
Weyden, 2001b). Moreover, the – increasing – fragmentation of the party system was a major 
source of concern: in 1999, six parties were needed to form a governing coalition, which 
required, since the division of the formerly national parties in 1960’s-1970’s and the 
introduction of the linguistic parity (Reuchamps, 2007), an agreement between parties from 
both communities. The fear of a further fragmentation rose again in 2001 when the Flemish 
nationalist party, Volksunie (People’s Union), split up into two parties the Nieuwe Vlaamse 
Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance, N-VA) and SPIRIT which stands for Sociaal (social), 
Progressief (progressive), Internationaal (international), Regionalistisch (regional), 
Integraal-democratisch (completely democratic), Toekomstgericht (future oriented) 
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(Deschouwer, 2004; van Haute and Pilet, 2006). The spectre of instability loomed wide in 
such a fragmented context (Verjans, 2009). 
 
As a reaction, the federal government led by Guy Verhofstadt drafted soon after the 
Volksunie’s split-up a proposal to introduce a legal electoral threshold of five per cent, which 
was quickly followed in April 2002 by a global agreement over a quite large electoral reform 
– as well as a reform of the institutions which however was never enacted (Vuye and 
Stangherlin, 2002; Rosoux, 2003). The core of the electoral reform was the enlargement of 
the districts to the provinces’ boundaries – with the exceptions of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoord 
and Leuven districts – bringing down the number of electoral districts from twenty to eleven 
(Blaise et al., 2003). This redistricting was actively supported by the larger ruling parties – the 
liberal and the socialist parties – which could therefore hope for bigger scores for their best-
known politicians, and by the way weaken the Christian Democrats who were traditionally 
stronger in local districts (Hooghe, 2003). It was also accepted by the two green parties as 
well as by other smaller parties who favoured provincial districts as a way not only to lower 
the effective threshold – and therefore obtain a seat more easily – but also to abolish the 
apparentment which was seen as unpredictable and unbeneficial for them (Pilet, 2007b, 210-
211). Finally, all governing parties also hoped the enlargement would increase the 
professionalisation of politics (Hooghe et al., 2003).  
 
The speed – and the success – of this electoral reform is definitely remarkable 
(Hooghe and Deschouwer, forthcoming 2011). Its success can be explained by the 
combination of, on the one hand, low legal barriers – no constitutional reform was needed, 
thus only a simple majority was required – in a country where such barriers are usually high 
(Rahat, 2008) and, on the other hand, strategic interests which “lie under the surface” (Pilet, 
2007b, 211). Indeed, the reform was presented as a package deal between the ruling parties. 
First of all, the redistricting was supposed to be neutral on the mathematical allocation of 
seats (Vander Weyden, 2001a; Pilet, 2007b), which was confirmed by the first election after 
the reform (Hooghe et al., 2003). Second, the redistricting which was especially pressed by 
the two smaller coalitions’ partners – the green parties – was linked with the introduction of a 
legal electoral threshold of five per cent at the level of each district (Onclin, 2009). Such a 
threshold was the compensation demanded by the four bigger ruling parties for the districts’ 
enlargement. Thus, a legal threshold – the apparentment – was replaced by another legal 
threshold – the five per cent threshold (Geudens, 2004). Following the German example, the 
bigger parties expected this threshold would not harm their vote shares “since their electoral 
support is spread quite evenly across the country” (Hooghe and Deschouwer, forthcoming 
2011, 19) and above all prevent a further fragmentation of the party system, which could even 
yield increased vote shares for them since such a threshold is detrimental for smaller parties 
(Cox, 1997). The green parties, although much smaller than their four other governing 
partners, also supported the proposal because they expected to maintain their electoral support 
much above five per cent, which rose in the 1999 election at a all-time high 14.4 per cent of 
the vote. They were wrong. In the following election, four years later, the Flemish Green 
Party fell under the five per cent threshold – which they approved –  and lost all their seats as 
we shall see below. 
 
 In contrast to the green parties, the other small parties were quite afraid of the 
consequences of this new threshold. Therefore they filed several actions before the 
Constitutional Court with mixed results (Brassinne de la Buissière, 2002; Muylle and Van 
Nieuwenhove, 2002-2003; Vuye et al., 2003; Bouhon, 2008). On the one hand, the Court 
approved the threshold for eight of the eleven new districts, as well as for the two electoral 
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colleges – Dutch-speaking and French-speaking – for the Senate’s elections. On the other 
hand, the Court rejected its introduction in three districts at the centre of the country: Leuven, 
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde and Walloon Brabant – between the latter two, the apparentment 
remains (Rosoux, 2003, 16). As a reaction to the introduction of the threshold in most 
districts, SPIRIT, one the heirs of Volksunie, formed a pre-electoral cartel with the Flemish 
socialist party, while the N-VA went its on way for the 2003 federal elections (Tréfois and 
Faniel, 2007).  
 
 Initially, the introduction of a legal electoral threshold was limited to the federal 
elections. Yet, after the 2003 elections, the new ruling coalitions – the socialists and the 
liberals, without the ecologists – decided in 2004 to introduce a threshold for the regional 
elections, too. Although the reform needed this time a two thirds majority in the two houses of 
the parliament – except for the elections of the German-speaking Community –, the 
government did not face any difficulties. Despite the opposition of the smaller parties – the 
green parties included –, a legal threshold of five per cent was introduced for each of the three 
Regions and the German-speaking Community (Arcq et al., 2004). In addition to that, the 
Flemish parliament decided to increase the size of the districts to the provinces’ boundaries, 
similarly to the federal redistricting. By contrast, the thirteen Walloon districts – for the 
regional elections – remained unchanged. There, the legal electoral threshold plays twice. In 
the first-tier division for each district, only the lists with a score above five per cent may 
participate in the allocation of seats. In the second-tier division at the level of the province, 
only the lists which have received sixty-six per cent of the electoral divisor and have scored at 
least five per cent of the votes in the whole province enter the allocation of seats. In Brussels, 
the electoral threshold is applied at the level of each linguistic group; that is, for instance, a 
Dutch-speaking list has to get at least five per cent of the votes of the Dutch-speaking 
linguistic group – bilingual lists may not exist. Furthermore, grouping of two or more lists – 
within the same linguistic group – is allowed; thus the obligation of five per cent falls on the 
“groupement” rather than on the individual lists – it’s a kind of apparentment within a single 
district (Arcq et al., 2004, 23). Finally, an electoral threshold also exists in the unique district 
for the elections of the German-speaking Community’s parliament.  
 
 To sum up, a legal five per cent electoral threshold was introduced for the federal 
elections (both Chamber and Senate) in 2002 and for the regional elections in 2004, 
sometimes with minor differences. The electoral system itself appears to be the main reason 
of the reform. Indeed, the threshold is the response to the increased fragmentation of political 
spectrum – in 1999, 0.74 for the Walloon Parliament and 0.82 for the Flemish Parliament (see 
below for the exact formula). Such an absolute measure hides however the real nature of the 
fragmentation which can be – at the least in the case of Belgium – better be apprehended in 
terms of the concentration of votes by the – three and traditional – main parties. In fact, the 
lower this concentration (and thus the higher the fragmentation between significant parties), 
the more difficult the formation of a coalition. On this regard, with a concentration’s score of 
62.3% in 1999 and of 67.7% in 2007, the situation in Flanders is more fragmented that in 
Wallonia where the concentration’s score was 70.2% in 1999 and 74.5% in 2007. In such a 
context of increased fragmentation, the legal threshold’s introduction is also the reaction to 
the emergence of two new parties, following the split of the Volksunie. Moreover, while the 
extreme right party in Flanders was not threaten, it was sometimes argued that the threshold 
could be harmful for the French-speaking Front national (Vuye et al., 2003). Yet, this 
analysis minimizes the impact of the effective electoral threshold which can be – much – 
higher, as we shall see below, than the legal electoral threshold. Therefore, the probability that 
the Front national does not obtain any seats because of the legal threshold is quite small, 
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except in Brussels where the effective threshold is very low. In addition to these reasons, 
there was also the will to have more transparent political and electoral procedures – especially 
after the 1999 crisis – in order to improve the trust of the population towards politics. Finally, 
the introduction of the threshold (pushed forwarded by the larger parties) came as a 
compensation for the enlargement of the districts and as a consequence the abolishment of 
apparentment (strongly favoured by the smaller parties).  
 
3. Data and method 
 
The effects of the legal electoral threshold have to be measured for each district in 
both federal and regional elections. Our study is based on three federal elections – 2003, 2007 
and 2010 – and two regional – 2004 and 2009. On the federal level, Belgians vote separately 
for the Chamber and the Senate. For the former, there are eleven districts; five Walloon 
(Hainaut, Namur, Liège, Luxembourg and Walloon Brabant), five Flemish (Antwerp, East-
Flanders, Leuven, Limburg and West-Flanders) and one bilingual (Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde). 
For the latter, although there are three districts (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Hal-
Vilvoorde), there are two electoral colleges (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking). 
On the regional level, there are some discrepancies between the entities. The elections for the 
Flemish Region are based on districts drawn on the provinces’ limits. The Walloon parliament 
is elected on the basis of thirteen districts. The Brussels and the German-speaking MP’s are 
elected from a single district; the former is divided into two linguistic groups, however. 
Finally, the French-speaking Community MP’s are not directly elected but chosen by the 
Brussels and the Walloon parliaments (Reuchamps and Onclin, 2009). 
  
Moreover, even if the five per cent threshold is applicable in most electoral districts, 
its effects should only be studied where it has a possible effect. First, the electoral threshold 
has no effect on the non-directly elected parliaments; therefore it has a possible effect neither 
on the Parliament of the French-speaking Community nor on the election of the 31 
Community or co-opted Senators – but well on the election of the 40 directly elected 
Senators. Second, as we mentioned above, the Constitutional Court cancelled the legal 
threshold in three federal districts – Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde, Leuven and Walloon Brabant. 
Third, the legal five per cent electoral threshold may only have a possible effect in districts 
where the legal threshold is higher than the natural electoral threshold. In broad terms, an 
electoral threshold can be defined as “the vote share that is necessary to win a seat” 
(Gallagher, 1992, 485). Whereas a legal threshold (LT) is fixed by a juridical norm, the 
theoretical natural threshold (th.NT) depends on the number of seats available in a district 
(N). It is equal to 100 divided by the number of seats in the district: th.NT = 100 / N. 
However, this view is purely theoretical. Indeed, the natural threshold varies not only with the 
number of seats but also with the distribution of the votes between the different lists (Bouhon, 
2008). Therefore, the effective natural threshold (ef.NT) can only be measured after the 
election; it varies for each district. Table 1 shows the districts where the legal threshold has a 
potential effect; that is to say the districts where the districts where the effective natural 
threshold is lower than five per cent. 
 
Table 1 Districts where the legal threshold has a potential effect 
Federal elections 
District Seats th.NT LT Difference ef.NT (2010) LT Difference 
Antwerp  24 4,16% 5,00% -0,84 3,67% 5,00% -1,33 
East-Flanders 20 5,00% 5,00% 0 4,11% 5,00% -0,89 






25 4,00% 5,00% -1 3,33% 5,00% -1,67 
Regional elections 
District Seats th.NT LT Difference ef.NT (2009) LT Difference 
Antwerp 33 3,03% 5,00% -1,97 2,71% 5,00% -2,29 
East-Flanders 27 3,70% 5,00% -1,3 3,13% 5,00% -1,87 
West-Flanders 22 4,54% 5,00% -0,46 3,95% 5,00% 1,05 
Flemish 









25 4,00% 5,00% -1 3,58% 5,00% -1,42 
 
 It appears that the legal threshold has a potential effect in – only – seven districts. But, 
considering the effective natural threshold, this number rises to ten districts. Moreover, the 
potential effect is relatively higher at the regional level than at the federal. In most cases, the 
legal threshold just exceeds the natural threshold, except in the French-speaking group of the 
Brussels Parliament where for the 2009 elections the legal threshold increased by 3,76% the 
threshold necessary to obtain a seat within this group. On this basis, our first objective is to 
measure the potential mechanical effects of the five per cent electoral threshold. Here, our aim 
is twofold. 
 
First, we calculate for each of the five elections the number of seats a party could have 
obtained in the absence of a legal threshold and we compare these results with the actual 
elections outcomes. In addition, we can also test the potential increase of the deficit of 
proportionality because of the threshold – i.e. the disproportional of the system. Indeed, the 
principle of the proportional representation is that the share of seats awarded to any party (S) 
should be equal to the share of the votes it has won (V), so that S/V = 1 – considering such an 
ideal type of proportional system is never reached in reality (Rae, 1971, 28). Our first 
hypothesis (H1) is pretty straight forward: the introduction of a legal threshold will increase 
the deficit of proportionality, so that: S(b) / V(b) < S(a) / V(a) </= 11. 
 
 Second, the study of the mechanical effect enables us to determine the threshold’s 
effects on the fractionalization of the seat shares (F.s). This measure seems quite important 
because the fear of a further fragmentation was one of the main goals of the 2002 electoral 
reform. In order to measure the fractionalization of the seat shares, it is not sufficient to 
calculate the number of parties represented at the different parliaments. Indeed, the relative 
equality of party shares, whatever their number, is also an integral part of the concept (Rae, 
1971, 54); therefore: F.s = 1 – (S1²+S2²+...+Sn²)2. We can formulate the hypothesis (H2) that 
the introduction of the legal threshold will reduce the fragmentation of the seat shares, so that: 
F.s(b) < F.s(a). 
 
 The study of the mechanical effects has to be completed by the measure of the 
potential psychological effects on both elites (number of lists and alliances) and voters 
                                                 
1 Where S is equal to the total of the share of seats reached by each by all the parties (S= S1+S2+...+Sn). And 
where V is equal to the total of the share of votes reached by all the parties (V = V1+V2+...+Vn). (a) 
represents the result without the legal threshold and (b) with the legal threshold.  
2 Where S equals to the seat share get by the different parties. 
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(strategic vote and wasted vote). The threshold’s impact on the former may be measured in 
two ways. On the one hand, we calculate first the correlation between the number of parties 
that participate in an election – i.e. the number of lists – and the number of seats available in a 
district – i.e. the natural electoral threshold. Then, we measure the evolution of the number of 
lists after the introduction of the legal threshold of five per cent. On this basis, the common 
hypothesis states (H3): the number of lists – and maybe the number of parties on the long run 
– decreases when a legal threshold is introduced in an electoral system (Blais and Carty, 
1991, 87). In addition, we can formulate the hypothesis (H4) that the average number of lists 
decreases as a consequence of the legal threshold and this decline is stronger in the districts 
where the legal threshold has a potential effect rather than where it has not. On the other hand, 
through a qualitative and quantitative approach, we study the alliance strategies between the 
different parties that face the elections. Indeed, party elites may form electoral cartels or 
alliances in order to maximize their chances to obtain the most seats as possible (Boix, 1999, 
609; Hooghe et al., 2006). While small parties may want to form an alliance in order to 
overtake the electoral threshold, bigger parties may want to increase their political strength, 
especially in a d’Hondt – highest average formula – system which favours biggest parties 
(Rae, 1971, 31). According to Boix, “the higher the entry barrier (or threshold) set by the 
electoral law, the more extensive strategic behavior will be” (Boix, 1999, 609). On this basis, 
we can surmise that number of cartels or alliances increases in an electoral system where a 
legal threshold has been introduced (H5).  
 
 Voters may also be influenced by a change in the electoral system. Several scholars 
have endeavoured to study the electoral rules’ psychological effects on voters (Shively, 1970; 
Cain, 1978; Blais and Carty, 1991). Yet, all of them concluded to a limited impact of electoral 
rules on voters’ strategies. Nonetheless, it is still useful to determine whether there is a – 
limited – impact of the legal electoral threshold on Belgian voters. To do so, we measure the 
correlation between the – level of the – electoral threshold in a district and the tendency of 
voters to choose for smaller parties. Indeed, to avoid wasting their vote on hopeless parties, 
voters may choose for another party albeit lower in their preference ordering (Boix, 1999). 
Adapting the model of Shively, we formulate the hypothesis (H6) that in districts where the 
likelihood that a certain party would obtain (at least) one seat was relatively low, this party 
votes share should increase less (in relative terms), or decrease more, than in other districts 
(Shively, 1970, 117). In order to determine whether a party would get a seat in a district, we 
divide the party’s score in this particular district at the previous election by the number of 
votes it was necessary to reach in order to obtain a seat – i.e. the effective electoral threshold. 
If a correlation is found, we will be able to gauge whether the legal threshold of five per cent 




Over the five elections at stake here, mechanical effects of the legal electoral threshold 
occurred only in two elections (Table 2). In the 2003 federal elections, the threshold cost the 
Flemish green party, Agalev, three seats and the N-VA lost two seats because of this new 
barrier (Swyngedouw, 2004). In the 2009 regional elections, two seats were allocated 
differently as a consequence of the legal threshold of five per cent – both in the French-
speaking group of the Brussels district. The mechanical effects of the legal threshold are thus 
quite limited. Nevertheless, in the recent history of the five per cent threshold, several parties 
have come near the loss of one or more seats. In the regional elections of 2004, the Front 
national got 5.42% of the votes within the French-speaking group in Brussels and obtained 
four seats which it would not have received – none of them – should it have scored 4.99% or 
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less. Thus, this 0.42% difference saved the Front national four seats, and thus all the financial 
means which come along. In 2009, for election of the Brussels Parliament, with a score of 
4.99%, the N-VA should not have obtained a seat because of the threshold. However, thanks 
to the mechanism of grouping the lists – which brought together all the Dutch-speaking 
parties but the Lijst Dedecker and the Vlaams Belang – it received one seat. 
 











 Groen! (before Agalev) (federal elections of 2003) 
Antwerp 4,50% 3,44% 5% 1 0 -1 
East-Flanders 4,52% 4,19% 5% 1 0 -1 
Dutch-speaking 
group (Senate) 4% 3,40% 5% 1 0 -1 
N-VA (federal elections of 2003) 
Antwerp 4,40% 3,44% 5% 1 0 -1 
Dutch-speaking 
group (Senate) 4,90% 3,40% 5% 1 0 -1 




Parliament)   
1,91% 1,24% 5% 1 0 -1 





1,67% 1,24% 5% 1 0 -1 
 
Our first hypothesis (H1) tests whether the introduction of the threshold amplifies the 
deficit of proportionality or not. Without the legal threshold, the Gallagher’s index – 
√ [(1/2)(Vi²-Si²)] – shows that the deficit of proportionality is not very high in Belgium – it is 
even quite good in comparison to other countries (Farrell, 2001). However, the impact of the 
electoral threshold on the index is quite limited. In 2003, the deficit of proportionality went 
from 4.68 to 5.09 for the Chamber and from 2.54 to 4.33 for the Senate. In the other instance 
of mechanical effects – the 2009 election in the French-speaking group in Brussels –, the 
index evolved slightly from 3.78 to 4.16. Thus, even when mechanical effects occur, the 
proportionality of the electoral system remains good; the legal threshold has not affected the 
Belgian system’s degree of proportionality.  
 
 Next to the degree of proportionality is the question of the fragmentation. The 
electoral threshold was introduced to prevent a further fragmentation of the political 
spectrum. Our second hypothesis (H2) verifies whether its introduction has met the 
expectations of its proponents in terms of a reduction of the seat shares’ fractionalization 
(F.s). The fractionalization has slightly decreased after the introduction of the threshold, but 
after three federal elections the level of fractionalization is back to its previous level (Table 
3a). Basically the same trends are to be found in the elections of the Walloon Parliament and 
the Flemish Parliament. In Brussels and in the German-speaking community, there 
fragmentation has slightly increased in ten years (Table 3b). 
 
Table 3a Evolution of the fragmentation in the federal elections 
  1999 2003 2007 2010 
Chamber 0,9 0,86 0,88 0,88 
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Senate 0,89 0,87 0,87 0,87 
 
Table 3b Evolution of the fragmentation in the regional elections 
  1999 2004 2009 
Walloon Parliament 0,74 0,69 0,72 
Flemish Parliament 0,82 0,77 0,84 
Brussels Parliament 0,79 0,81 0,82 
German-speaking 
Community Parliament 0,76 0,79 0,81 
 
 The mechanical effects of the legal threshold are indeed limited. Its effects are bigger 
– albeit still small – in districts where the magnitude is high. Thus, the higher a district’s 
magnitude, the more likely the mechanical effects in this district. In Belgium, it is the case of 
the French-speaking linguistic group in the Brussels regional elections as well as in the 
Dutch-speaking college in the Senate elections and the large Flemish districts of Antwerp and 
East Flanders. The existence of the natural effective threshold explains the limited impact of 
the five per cent threshold: in most districts, there is a natural threshold that is higher than five 
per cent. Corollary, the introduction of a legal threshold basically did not affect the 
(dis)proportionality of the electoral system because the mechanical effects are limited and, 
when they occurred, they occurred in districts where the deficit of proportionality was lower 
than average, due to their high magnitude. Linked to the mechanical effects, the 
fractionalization of seats has slightly decreased. In sum, the legal threshold did not have much 
impact on the fragmentation. 
 
Nevertheless as Hooghe, Maddens and Noppe have shown (Hooghe et al., 2006), the 
legal electoral threshold is not only a story of seats but also a story of money. Indeed, the five 
per cent threshold cost Agalev and the N-VA respectively three and two seats in the 2003 
federal elections. As a consequence these two parties were not eligible anymore to the annual 
federal subsidy allowed to parties which have at least one directly elected representative in 
both the Chamber and the Senate; since then, the criterion has become one directly elected 
representative in one of the two chambers (Weekers et al., 2009). Altogether, the two parties 
lost in 2003 more than one million euros. Thus, although the threshold has limited mechanical 
effects, it may have dramatic consequences on party finance, especially in a country where 
parties rely heavily on state funding which is allocated according to the number of seats rather 
than the number of votes (van Biezen, 2003). The threshold’s mechanical effects and their 
potential financial consequences may influence its psychological effects to which we turn 
now.  
 
As a reaction to the introduction of a legal threshold (and thus its potential mechanical 
effects), psychological effects may occur at the level of both the electorate and the parties. It 
is often assumed that voters as well as party elites will adapt their behaviours to a new 
electoral rule. Because the latter are directly concerned by the introduction of the electoral 
threshold, bigger psychological effects might be expected on the party system and on the 
parties themselves (H3, H4 and H5) than on the voters (H6). Indeed, soon after the legal 
threshold was introduced in Belgium, small parties which were the main targets of the reform 
faced difficult strategic choices. That was particularly the case for the two heirs of the 
Volksunie; in 1999 that party which was not split yet scored 8.2%. For the 2003 elections, it 
was therefore predicted the two new parties would not be able to meet the five per cent 
threshold. The two parties adopted opposite strategies, however. Spirit formed an electoral 
cartel with the Flemish socialist party, while the N-VA decided to go on its own – in order to 
hold on its radical nationalist discourse (Hooghe et al., 2006). Since the green parties, Agalev 
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and Ecolo, voted the reform and on the basis of their previous electoral results, they did not 
expect to be harmed by the new threshold. Nevertheless, as the study of the mechanical 
effects has showed, Agalev and the N-VA were hardly hit by the five per cent threshold 
which cost them their representation in Parliament. 
 
These pre-electoral strategies reveal deeper psychological effects of the legal threshold 
on elites’ behaviours. To capture them, we measure first the correlation between the effective 
electoral threshold in a district and the number of parties in competition within this particular 
district – i.e. the number of lists. Our hypothesis (H3) is: the higher the effective threshold, the 
more likely a lower number of lists. Indeed, the reactions of the small parties to the 
implementation of the threshold demonstrate that elites are prone to adapt their strategies. We 
calculate the correlation between the average number of lists – for each of the five elections – 
and the effective electoral threshold (Table 4). It is important here to distinguish the Walloon 
districts from the Flemish districts because the party systems and therefore the lists are quite 
different. 
 
Table 4 Correlation between the average number of lists 
and the effective electoral threshold 
Election Year r (Walloon Districts) 
r (Flemish 
Districts) 
2003 -0,95 -0,66 
2007 -0,91 0,13 Federal 
2010 -0,83 -0,73 
2004 -0,76 -0,55 Regional 
2009 -0,79 0,17 
 
In the Walloon districts, it appears that there are strong correlations between the 
number of lists and the district magnitude – and consequently, the level of the effective 
threshold. However, these correlations are stronger for the federal elections than for the 
regional. This – quite small, however – difference can be explained by the survival of the 
apparentment mechanism in the thirteen Walloon districts for the regional elections, which 
renders the level of the electoral threshold less predicable in these districts (Leutgäb and 
Pukelsheim, 2009). On the Flemish side, correlations do not appear to be neither as strong, 
nor as stable than in the Walloon side. This finding can be explained by the smaller variations 
of the threshold’s level between Flemish districts. Whereas the theoretical threshold for the 
federal elections only varies from 5% to 14.28% in the Flemish side in the latter, it varies 
from 5.26% to 21% in the Walloon districts. The difference is even more significant in the 
regional elections where the difference between theoretical thresholds amounts to 42.31% in 
Wallonia, versus 1.25% in Flanders. Therefore, the likelihood to obtain a seat is quite the 
same across Flemish district and does not urge political elites to adopt strategic behaviours. 
 
The district magnitude has an impact on elites’ strategies. In fact, the number of lists 
tends to diminish in the districts where the effective electoral threshold is low(er) and to 
increase where the effective electoral threshold is high(er). The main reason behind this 
phenomenon is that smaller parties do not run election in districts where their likelihood to get 
a seat is low. Blais came to a similar conclusion in single-member plurality elections (Blais, 
2002). Indeed, party elites devote fewer resources in districts with a smaller magnitude (Coffé 
et al., 2007, 147). Furthermore, we observe that such a psychological effect on elites exists 
only if the change of electoral laws has a significant impact. That is the reason why we found 
a correlation between the number of lists and the effective threshold only in Wallonia where 
there is a large difference between the districts’ effective thresholds. 
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The test of the previous hypothesis confirmed the existence of a psychological effect 
of electoral thresholds’ level on party elites. The next hypothesis (H4) goes one step further: 
the – indirect – measure of the legal threshold on elites’ strategies. Should this threshold has – 
had – an impact, the average number of lists would have dropped after its introduction. 
Moreover, this decline should be stronger in districts where the legal threshold has a potential 
effect than where it has none. 
 
Table 5 Average number of lists before and after the introduction of the 
legal threshold 
Districts (federal and 
regional) 
Before the legal 
threshold (1999) 
After the legal 
threshold (2003-2010) 
All districts 12,47 11,63 
Districts with a 
possible effect 13,7 11,3 
Districts without a 
possible effect 11,96 11,75 
 
Table 5 shows that the average number of lists per district has decreased after the 
introduction of the five per cent threshold. However, this decline is quite limited (from 12.47 
to 11.63). Yet, this decrease is bigger – more than two lists – in districts where the five per 
cent threshold has a possible effect, whereas the average number of lists remains nearly 
unchanged in districts without a possible effect. This phenomenon happens because small 
political parties are discouraged from participating in elections since they are unlikely to 
obtain any seats (Cox, 1997; Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008). It should be emphasised that this 
phenomenon of pre-electoral coalitions does not explain this difference since, as we shall see 
below, such cartels or alliance are indeed formed in order to present a list in each district, 
regardless of the legal threshold’s possible impact. 
 
 
 A closer look to the evolution of the number of lists shows different dynamics. First, 
both at the federal and at the regional level, the number of lists has been decreasing more in 
districts where the legal threshold has a possible effect than where it has not. Second, the two 
graphs demonstrate a direct and strong decline, following the introduction of the legal 
threshold. In the very short-term, the number of lists has dropped substantially. However, 
after a first cycle of elections with a legal threshold, the regional landscapes took a different 
path than the federal. Whereas the decline continues – steadily in districts with a possible 
effect – for the former, the number of lists is almost back to its 1999 level in the regional 
elections. A learning process may explain this evolution: parties may learn from the short-
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term effects of electoral reform (Johnston and Pattie, 2002; Norris, 2004, 4). This would 
explicate the difference between federal districts with a possible effect and federal districts 
without – where the decline in the number of parties has much slowed down. Yet, 
paradoxically in the regional district – French-speaking group of the Brussels elections – 
where the difference between the effective threshold and the legal threshold is the greatest the 
number of lists has risen. Therefore sociological explanations are also needed to illuminate 
the potential effects of the legal threshold. In Brussels as well as in the other regions of the 
country, new parties have emerged on the political scene to fill in gaps in the political 
representation. For instance, ProBruxsel and Musulmans.be have ran in recent elections; the 
former has a programme in favour of Brussels as a region next to Flanders and Wallonia and 
the latter is a Muslim-oriented platform. Finally, the slow down of the decline is also the 
consequence of the evolving pre-electoral coalitions business, to which we turn now.  
The decline of number of lists is both a direct and an indirect result of the five per cent 
threshold’s psychological effects on political elites. Direct, as we have just noted, since 
leaders of – smaller – parties may decide not to present a list in districts where they stand little 
chance to win a seat. Indirect, as we shall see, because party elites may want to avoid the 
potentially harmful effects of the threshold by forming pre-electoral coalitions. Indeed, 
political actors adopt different strategies depending on some institutional constraints. As 
reminded by Gschwend and Hooghe, « all electoral systems disadvantage small parties and 
favour large parties when it comes to the translation of votes into seats » (Gschwend and 
Hooghe, 2008, 557). The main condition for the creation of a cartel or an alliance lies with a 
win-win requirement for both partners. The smaller partner is willing to join a larger party in 
order to make sure it meets the legal threshold, while the larger party is prone to form a cartel 
– even though it has to water down its own programme – in order to increase its votes share 
(Pilet, 2007b) and to become the first party. The status of “first party” is quite important in 
Belgian politics since such a party will lead the negotiations to form the ruling coalitions – 
which will usually be led by one of its prominent member. Our last hypothesis (H5) about the 
psychological effects on party elites concerns the number of pre-electoral coalitions – namely 
cartels; intuitively one can assume that the number of such electoral alliances increases as a 
consequence of the introduction of the legal electoral threshold of five per cent.  
 
Three coalitions quickly emerged in the Flemish party system as a consequence of the 
introduction of the legal threshold (Tréfois and Faniel, 2007; Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008). 
We already mentioned the first electoral coalition: the cartel SP.a-Spirit. This association was 
quite successful. The cartel won 23 of the 88 Flemish seats in the 2003 federal elections and 
Spirit sent one minister to the federal government. In the beginning of 2004, the neo-liberal 
party Vivant concluded a coalition with the Liberals (VLD). On its own, this – very – small 
party got only one seat at the 1999 regional elections and none at the 2003 federal elections. 
The five per cent threshold seemed a too high barrier and it was therefore unlikely for Vivant 
to get a seat at the 2004 regional elections. Finally, after having experienced the harmful 
effects of the electoral threshold in 2003, the N-VA agreed with the Christan-Democrats 
(CD&V) to introduce a common list for the 2004 regional elections. This decision was 
rewarded by the voters: the cartel came first from the ballots. Altogether CD&V and N-VA 
secured 35 representatives (out of 124) and the N-VA joined the ruling coalition with an 
important portfolio – Administrative Affairs, Foreign Policy, Media and Tourism. 
 
Yet, five elections after the implementation of the threshold, none of these cartels exist 
anymore. Two of these coalitions split up a few years later and one let to a single party. On 
the one hand, Vivant merged with the VLD in 2007 in order to form the new party Open Vld. 
On the other hand, both CD&V/N-VA and Sp.a/Spirit cartels split up. As Hooghe and 
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Deschouwer note “[r]econciling two different party platforms […] proved not to be easy” 
(Hooghe and Deschouwer, forthcoming 2011, 21). Despite their landslide victory in the 2007 
federal elections, the tensions within the cartel CD&V–N-VA came to the front in the 
political turmoil that followed the 2007 elections (Sinardet, 2008). The radical stance of the 
nationalist party on the linguistic and institutional issues made impossible for the N-VA to 
continue their coalition with the CD&V. Indeed, the N-VA’s refusal to support the project of 
State reform called to the end of the cartel in September 2008. Nevertheless, on its own, the 
N-VA got 13.06% of the votes in the regional elections of 2009 and one year later, in the 
federal elections, it became the first party of the country. Almost simultaneously, the SP.a-
Spirit coalition also dissolved. The latter felt unrepresented within the coalition, contrary to 
the N-VA in its own cartel. In December 2009, the small left-wing party Spirit – which had 
become Sociale Liberale Partij (SLP) – merged with the ecologist party Groen!. Indeed, with 
a score of 1.1% in the 2009 regional elections, the SLP could not expect to obtain any 
representative at all. 
 
This dual process of coalitions-formation and coalitions-dissolution shed light on the 
evolution of the number of lists. Although the fragmentation went down as a direct and 
immediate consequence of the legal threshold’s introduction, the number of list rose as soon 
as the second elections with the five per cent threshold. Cartels seem to be temporary; they 
reflect short-tem interested-based strategies rather than long-term ideological convergences 
(Onclin, 2009). Yet, the phenomenon of pre-electoral coalitions should not be underestimated. 
In the Flemish Region, following the introduction of the legal threshold of five per cent, six 
parties – on a total of nine represented in the Parliament – decided to conclude a coalition. At 
the height of the cartel period in 2007, these six parties represented more than 70% of the seat 
share in Flanders. This sizeable phenomenon contrasts with the situation in Wallonia, where 
no cartel has been formed. This difference can be explained by the fact that the legal threshold 
of five per cent has very limited – or even not at all – mechanical effects in the Walloon 
districts both in the federal and regional elections. In sum, there is a – strong – relation 
between the effects of the legal threshold and the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions, that is 
to say strategic behaviours of the party elites. To conclude our survey, our last hypothesis 
verifies the existence of psychological effects on voters. 
 
 The existence or not of strategic voting has been lively debated not only in the context 
of majority systems (Duverger, 1951) but also of proportional systems (Leys, 1959; Sartori, 
1976). In the latter, Cox argues there is some strategic voting but it disappears in districts 
where the magnitude is over than five (Cox, 1997, 10). In the absence of survey data (Hooghe 
et al., 2006, 362), an indirect measure of the psychological effects on the electorate may be 
used. Rae and Shively provide such methods to test whether the legal threshold modifies 
voters’ strategies – i.e. whether voters tend not to choose their preferred party where the 
threshold is higher and thus the chances for this party to obtain a seat are lower. The former 
suggests to look at the correlation between votes fragmentation – and not the seats 
fragmentation, see above – and the electoral threshold (Rae, 1971, 56). The latter proposes to 
take into account the likelihood of a party to obtain a seat in a district (Shively, 1970). 
 
 The formula of the votes fragmentation is a two-step process (Rae, 1971, 56). First, we 
test whether there is a correlation between the votes fragmentation and the electoral threshold. 
If so, the next step is to verify whether it drops where the legal threshold has a possible effect. 
Nonetheless, our calculations reveal there is no correlation. For instance, when we compare 
the votes fragmentation in the 2009 regional elections between the district of Arlon-Marche-
Bastogne where the effective threshold is 33.33% and the district of Liège where the effective 
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threshold is 7.69%, we find a similar fragmentation of 0.76. The socio-economic context and 
not the electoral barrier play a greater role in the elections outcomes. 
 
 If a straight forward formula does not reveal any psychological effects, a more refined 
formula might show some signs of strategic voting. The likelihood of a party to obtain a seat 
in a district may be obtained by dividing the vote share for this party at the previous election 
by the effective electoral threshold at the previous election. This test may be done for each 
election and for each party, as long as the same party presents a list in two subsequent 
elections. Because of the cartels’ phenomenon in Flanders, we may calculate the likelihood to 
obtain a seat for all parties in the Walloon districts for the two regional elections (2004 and 
2009) and in the Flemish districts only for Groen!, LDD, Open Vld and VB in the 2010 
federal elections. Our findings show that there is almost no correlation either in Flanders or in 
Wallonia. Indeed, voters of bigger parties do not have to adopt such strategies since their 
parties are big enough to secure at least one seat. If very few voters of the small parties seem 
to adopt a strategic behaviour, this ratio is too low to be measured at a global level (the 
correlation for the FN is -0.08 in 2004 and -0.21 in 2009). Indeed, other factors may influence 
the electoral behaviour of voters, for instance the presence of a charismatic leader in a district 
or the incidence of scandals in another district. All in all, there is a very limited impact of the 




Belgium has a fairly good proportional electoral system. However, some believe it is 
too fragmented; that is to say there are too many – small but big enough to catch some 
representation – parties and too many parties are needed to form a ruling coalition. To reduce 
or at least prevent further fragmentation, a legal electoral threshold of five per cent – a 
common practice in Western democracies – was introduced first for the federal elections in 
2002 and then for the regional elections in 2004. Since the introduction of the legal threshold, 
five elections took place. The mechanical effects of the legal threshold have been so far 
limited. The existence of a usually higher than five per cent effective threshold explains the 
limited impact of the legal threshold. In fact, only ten constituencies could have experienced 
mechanical effects. As a result, the proportionality of the electoral system remains unaffected. 
Thus, the legal threshold of five per cent has not threatened the principle of proportionality in 
Belgium. On the side of psychological effects, the picture is more nuanced. Whereas the 
psychological effects on voters were almost inexistent, these effects on party elites were, on 
the short term, sharper. Indeed, the five elections we looked at have seen a decrease in the 
average number of lists and an increase in the number of pre-electoral coalitions. 
Nevertheless, on the long term, pre-electoral coalitions have dissolved and the effective 
number of parties has started to rise again.  
 
 The main objective of the five per cent threshold was to prevent a further 
fragmentation of the political spectrum, especially in the Flemish districts. Yet, although the 
fragmentation slightly dropped after its introduction, this index is now almost back to its 1999 
level. In fact, five per cent is not a high enough threshold to fight fragmentation in Belgium 
where several small parties are big enough to avoid the effects of the threshold. Nevertheless, 
and paradoxically, a higher threshold (or a threshold required for a larger area) would be more 
likely to impact the fragmentation of the system but simultaneously would – perhaps 
excessively – impact the proportionality of the system. Above all, despite the existence of the 
legal threshold, new parties have emerged. The Lijst Dedecker was founded in 2007 and 
obtained 7.6% for its first elections, clearly above the electoral threshold. It has currently lost 
 15 
much of its appeal, however. In 2010, the newly created Parti populaire got one seat in 
Walloon Brabant – seat it would not have received, should the legal threshold exist in this 
district, however. Five elections after the introduction of a legal threshold in Belgium, the 
impact of such a threshold should be nuanced. Several small parties were badly hurt in the 
short term – and suffered the consequences of a loss of representation in terms of a dramatic 
reduction of their state funding. While some disappeared – usually through a merger with 
another party – most of them are still active and some of them are thriving, as the example of 
the N-VA shows. Larger parties did not really take advantage of the reform and in fact 
continue to face the same problem of fragmentation, which still characterizes Belgium’s 
political spectrum. Finally, voters, when they are aware of the threshold, tend not think of the 
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